

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION**

-----)	
)	
In re FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE)	Cause No. 3:05-MD-527-RM
SYSTEM, INC., EMPLOYMENT)	(MDL 1700)
PRACTICES LITIGATION)	
)	
-----)	
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:)	
)	
<i>Charlie Bertram, et al. v. FedEx Ground</i>)	
<i>Package System, Inc.,</i>)	
Civil No. 3:05-cv-00666-RLM-CAN (KY))	
-----)	

AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a class of persons similarly situated (“Plaintiff Class Members”), state the following for their Complaint against Defendant:

PARTIES

1. Plaintiffs Charlie Bertram, John Coleman, William Cress, Barry Hindman and George Saunders are each former delivery drivers employed by the Defendant, who delivered packages for, and on behalf of, the Defendant within the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

2. Defendant FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (“FEG”), and its division, FedEx Home Delivery (“FHD”) (hereinafter together referred to as “Defendant” or “FEG”), is a Delaware corporation doing business as two national companies, affiliated with the Federal Express Corporation. At all relevant times, and within six years of the filing of this Complaint, Defendant was engaged in providing small package information, transportation and delivery services in the United States, including in the State of Kentucky.

3. Defendant is qualified to, and does, transact business in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, including locations in Jefferson County.

4. Defendant employs local package delivery drivers for FEG and FHD, all of whom, at FEG's and FHD's direction and control, perform package delivery to local businesses and residences in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court based upon the diversity of citizenship of the parties.

6. Venue is proper in this Court as the illegal conduct alleged herein occurred within this district and throughout the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

7. This action is brought on behalf of the Plaintiff Class Members, who are current and former employees of Defendant within the definition of "employee" as found in Kentucky common and statutory law, but who, similar to the named Plaintiffs, are or were erroneously and illegally classified as "contractors" or "independent contractors." The Plaintiff Class Members are or were route delivery drivers for FEG and FHD. The Class includes all such persons employed by Defendant within the five-year statute of limitations. The "Class" is specifically defined as follows:

All individuals who worked for Defendant FedEx Ground System, Inc. and/or its subsidiary FedEx Home Delivery, Inc. in Kentucky from September 13, 1999 to September 13, 2005 (the Class Period), as package pick-up and delivery drivers, and who were classified as "independent contractors" and thereby deprived of various protections under Kentucky law.

Plaintiffs believe that the Class as defined above includes over 1,000 members.

8. FEG and FHD employ thousands of drivers to pick up and deliver packages for its customers throughout the United States. As a condition of employment, each FEG and FHD driver is required to sign a lengthy form contract entitled the "Pick-up And Delivery Contractor

Operating Agreement” that mischaracterizes each driver as an “independent contractor.” These operating agreements conceal the true nature of the relationship between Defendant and its drivers: that of employer and employee.

9. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members, were denied the accoutrements of employment, including, but not limited to:

- a. wages;
- b. overtime pay;
- c. holiday pay;
- d. workers’ compensation;
- e. unemployment insurance;
- f. contributions to Defendant’s retirement plan;
- g. participation in Defendant’s Employee Stock Purchase Plan;
- h. income tax withholding; and,
- i. meal, break and rest periods.

10. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members, were required to pay Defendant’s operating expenses, all of which should have been paid by Defendant, including, but not limited to:

- a. delivery vehicle purchase;
- b. various insurances, including vehicle insurance and work accident insurance;
- c. delivery vehicle maintenance and repairs;
- d. purchase and maintenance of logos and uniforms;
- e. fuel;
- f. cargo claims; and,
- g. “business support,” including maps, signs, logos, training and scanners.

11. Despite Defendant's control over virtually all material aspects of the employment relationship, and despite the unequivocal command of applicable statutes and case law to the effect that workers such as Plaintiffs are entitled to the protections due employees under Kentucky law, and despite the finding of the Los Angeles Superior Court in Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc. (Case # BC 210130) that these drivers are employees, Defendant continues to misclassify its drivers as independent contractors. As a result, these drivers are deprived of the rights and protections guaranteed by Kentucky law to employees, and they are deprived of employer-financed workers compensation coverage and unemployment insurance benefits. Furthermore, the terms and conditions of their employment contract require these drivers to purchase, operate and maintain expensive trucks for Defendant's exclusive benefit and to work under other unlawful conditions. Defendant's mischaracterization of its drivers as independent contractors, the concealment and/or non-disclosure of the true nature of the relationship between Defendant and its drivers and the attendant deprivation of substantial rights and benefits of employment are part of an on-going unlawful and fraudulent business practice by Defendant which this court should enjoin.

12. The named Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because they were treated in the same manner as other Plaintiff Class Members by the Defendant and they have been damaged by this treatment in the same manner as other Plaintiff Class Members by their exclusion from employee compensation programs, plans and agreements and employee benefit plans and rights.

13. There are common questions of law and fact applicable to the entire Class including, but not limited to, the question whether Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members are entitled to certain types of employee compensation and benefits because they are employees of

Defendant as defined by common and statutory law, even though Defendant has misrepresented to Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members their true employment status.

14. This case should be certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the common questions of law and fact concerning Defendant's liability predominate over any individual question over the amount of damages to each person and that:

- a. The members of the Class are so numerous that their individual joinder in a single action is impossible and/or impracticable;
- b. The central questions of law and fact involved in this action are of a common or general interest and those common legal and factual issues predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the common questions of law and fact are the following:
 - i. Whether Class Members have been misclassified as independent contractors pursuant to Defendant's operating agreements;
 - ii. Whether the Defendant has violated their legal obligations under various provisions of Kentucky law;
 - iii. Whether Defendant unlawfully failed to provide workers compensation insurance benefits and unemployment insurance benefits to the Class members in violation of Kentucky Law;
 - iv. Whether Defendant intentionally and/or negligently misrepresented to Plaintiffs and the Class they seek to represent their true employment status and thereby induced them to incur substantial expenses in reliance on such representations and;
 - v. Whether injunctive and declaratory relief and an equitable accounting are proper.

15. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are identical to the claims of other members of the Class. The named Plaintiffs share the same interests as other members of the Class in this action because, like other Plaintiff Class Members, they have each been misclassified and suffered financial loss of thousands of dollars due to Defendant's wrongful misclassification. Given the significance of their losses, they have the incentive, and are committed, to vigorously

prosecuting this action. They have retained competent and experienced counsel who specialize in class action and employment litigation to represent them and the proposed class;

16. A class action is the only realistic method available for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The expense and burden of individual litigation makes it impracticable for members of the Class to seek redress individually for the wrongful conduct alleged herein. Were each individual member required to bring a separate lawsuit, the resulting multiplicity of proceedings would cause undue hardship and expense for the litigants and the Court and create the risk of inconsistent rulings which would be contrary to the interest of justice and equity.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

17. Defendant is a corporation whose business consists of package delivery and pick-up service to customers, using a single integrated nationwide network of transportation, communication and sorting facilities and integrating Class Members into that existing network of operations. Defendant hired Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members to deliver and pick up packages based on times, locations and for amounts determined solely by Defendant.

18. Defendant employs or employed during the class period more than 1,000 delivery and pick-up drivers in the State of Kentucky including, either currently or at material times in the past, each of the Plaintiffs.

19. Each pick-up and delivery driver (referred to by Defendant as a “P&D contractor”) must sign a “Pick-Up and Delivery Contractor Operating Agreement” and Addenda thereto (referred to hereinafter as combined as “OA” or the “Operating Agreement” or “Agreement”) as a mandatory condition of employment. The date, time, and place of execution of each driver’s Operating Agreement is within the knowledge of Defendant as each Agreement is maintained in the driver files described above, in the regular course of business. The

Operating Agreement between each member of the Plaintiff Class and Defendant is the same in all material respects. The Operating Agreement between Plaintiffs and FEG and between Plaintiffs and FHD contain all of the same identical material terms with only a few, minor and insubstantial differences.

20. The Operating Agreement contains various statements purporting to classify Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members as independent contractors. At the same time, the Operating Agreement retains to the company, *inter alia*, the right to approve or disapprove any vehicle used to provide service, the right to approve or disapprove any driver or helper who provides service, the right to approve or disapprove the purchase or sale of any vehicle, the right to assign pick-up and delivery stops to each driver, the right to temporarily or permanently transfer portions of any route to another with or without compensation, the right to determine when a driver has “too few” or “too many” packages to deliver on a given day, the right to inspect vehicles and drivers for compliance with company-promulgated appearance standards, the right to terminate the contract upon thirty days notice or whenever the company unilaterally determines that any provision of the contract has been “violated” amounting to the right to terminate at will, the right to require the use of communication equipment and the wearing of company uniforms, the right to take a vehicle out of service, the right to review and evaluate “customer service” and to set and change standards of such service, the right to require drivers to perform service at “times” requested by customers and determined by Defendant, the right to withhold pay for certain specified expenses, the right to require purchase of specified insurance and numerous other purchases by drivers, the right to require completion of specified paperwork, and other rights reserved to Defendant.

21. The Operating Agreement is and at all relevant times has been a contract of adhesion, drafted exclusively by Defendant and/or its legal counsel, with no negotiation with drivers, who are required to sign the Agreement as a condition of employment. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members are required to sign the Agreement as is, without any changes made to the terms contained therein. Each year, drivers are required to sign additional Addenda which are likewise not subject to negotiation and are unilaterally drafted adhesion contract provisions. The Agreement is, and at all material times has been unlawful, unconscionable, and fraudulent in form and effect.

22. Defendant also has created and regularly updated a large number of written policies and procedures outside of the Operating Agreement that drivers are never given, but nonetheless are required to follow in their work. Defendant's written policies are contained in Ground Manual, Operations Management Handbook, Settlement Manual, and numerous other written and extra-contractual policies that are actively concealed from drivers and which Defendant fails to disclose and/or provide to drivers that govern the relationship between Defendant and the drivers. The other written handbooks, manuals and additional extra-contractual sources include, but are not limited, to written rules on "contractor" termination, directives, and training provided to terminal managers, written rules on driver appearance (with illustrative poster), written and oral complaint procedures, memorandum and directives to terminal management and other rules concealed from and not provided to the drivers. When drivers do not follow an FEG or FHD rule, whether disclosed or undisclosed, known or unknown, they are subject to various types of punishment, some financial and some disciplinary, up to and including contract termination and/or non-renewal. Defendant documents such so-called violations of such rules on forms referred to as "Business Discussion Notes" and retains

these documents in secret driver files called “DOT” files, along with myriad other documents which are likewise concealed from and not disclosed to the drivers.

23. Defendant maintains compensation and benefit plans, agreements and programs available to persons who are “employees” of Defendant. The benefit plans include: Health Benefit Plan, Life Insurance Plan, Short-term and Long-term Disability Plans, Accidental Death & Dismemberment and Survivor Income Plan, Employee Stock Purchase Plan, Business Travel Accident Plan, and Retirement and 401 (K) Savings Plans. In addition, employees of Defendant receive additional compensation programs, plans, rights, and benefits, including vacation, holidays, sick leave, other types of paid leave, and stock purchase rights.

24. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members have been excluded from the foregoing compensation plans and programs and benefit plans for all or a portion of their employment at Defendant due to their misclassification as non-employees.

25. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members have incurred expenses for equipment, insurance and other expenses that Defendant requires them to purchase under the Agreement.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
VIOLATION OF K.R.S. § 337.060 AND § 337.070

26. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

27. Defendant intentionally misclassified the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members as “independent contractors,” though they are, as a matter of law and fact, “employees” as set forth in Kentucky statutory and common law.

28. By misclassifying the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members as “independent contractors,” Defendant has fraudulently withheld monies from the compensation earned by Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members.

29. These withholdings have been used for the benefit of Defendant, including, but not limited to vehicle expenses, cargo claims and insurance claims in violation of K.R.S. § 337.060.

30. Further, Defendant has assessed fees and fines against Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members and deducted the same from their wages. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members have not expressly and freely given written consent to such deductions, and these deductions are not made according to any legally recognizable wage assignment.

31. Defendant has withheld said funds unlawfully without providing Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members with advance notice of the amounts, reasons or documentation to justify such deductions, and absent any lawfully sufficient reason for such conduct.

32. Defendant knowingly made the deductions and purposefully failed to provide the information specific to the deductions to the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members. These failures and omissions were not in good faith and Defendant had no reasonable grounds to believe that the violation was not a violation of Kentucky law.

33. Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members for the full amount of wages withheld in violation of K.S. §§ 337.060 and 337.070, as well as an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and for costs and such reasonable attorney's fees as may be allowed by the Court.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
FRAUD

34. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members hereby incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein, and further allege:

35. Plaintiffs and the Class they represent were purportedly hired by Defendant to work as "independent contractors" pursuant to the terms of the OA described above. In fact,

Defendant knew or should have known, at all times, that the “independent contractor” classification in the Operating Agreement was improper and that Plaintiffs and all persons similarly situated were “employees” entitled to the benefits and protections of all laws enacted for employees. Plaintiffs are informed, believe and on that basis allege, that through the OA Defendant intentionally misled Plaintiffs and the Class they represent as to their employment status, or made such representations to Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members recklessly and/or negligently, and deliberately concealed from and/or failed to disclose to the pick-up and delivery drivers the extra contractual sources (including but not limited to Ground Manual, Operation Management Handbook, Settlement Manual, and other policies and secret driver files described above) that defined the employment relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendant, all for the purpose of realizing unjust profits from Plaintiffs’ work and/or to avoid paying for its operating costs and payroll taxes to increase its competitiveness.

36. At all material times, Defendant either knew, or should have known, that the material representation made to Plaintiffs in the OA concerning their employment status, and the concealment and/or non-disclosure of material facts to Plaintiffs concerning their employment status and Plaintiffs’ corresponding obligation to assume responsibility for all of their “own” employment-related expenses including, but not limited to, purchasing or leasing, operating and maintaining expensive trucks, were false and fraudulent.

37. At all material times, Defendant intended to and did induce Plaintiffs and the Class they represent to reasonably and justifiably rely to their detriment on the false and fraudulent representations made to them by Defendant in the OA concerning their employment status and obligation to assume responsibility for all employment-related expenses including but

not limited to purchasing or leasing, operating and maintaining expensive trucks, and suffered damage as a direct and proximate result.

38. By its aforesaid conduct, Defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, and malice in violating Plaintiffs' rights and protections guaranteed by Kentucky law and other applicable law.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
RESCISSION

39. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members hereby incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein, and further allege:

40. Despite the express terms of the Operating Agreement, Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Class Members' relationship with Defendant satisfies every aspect of the test for employment, and not for independent contractor status.

41. Defendant controls virtually every aspect of the Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Class Members' work and earnings, as set forth in the general allegations hereof at paragraphs 17 through 25.

42. Despite this control and the actual status of the drivers as employees, Defendant mischaracterizes the Plaintiffs as independent contractors. As a result, these drivers must pay substantial sums of their own money for work-related expenses, including but not limited to the purchase or lease of vehicles meeting company specifications, and all costs of operating, insuring and maintaining those vehicles.

43. The Operating Agreement illegally and unfairly advantages Defendant, by mischaracterizing the status of the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members in that Defendant evades employment-related obligations, such as social security contributions, workers' compensation coverage, and state disability and unemployment compensation, illegally shifting

the expense of workers' compensation coverage and other expenses to Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members.

44. The Operating Agreement between Defendant and each Plaintiff and member of the Class is void as against public policy and therefore unenforceable, as failing to recognize the employment status of the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members, and therefore denying them the legally cognizable benefits of employment.

45. The Operating Agreement between Defendant and each Plaintiff and member of the Class is an unconscionable contract of adhesion, which is unenforceable as contrary to the public interest, policy and law.

46. The Operating Agreement illegally shifts the burden of certain costs that an employer must pay.

47. While acting on the direct instruction of Defendant and discharging their duties for Defendant, Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members incurred expenses for, *inter alia*, the purchase or lease, maintenance, operating costs and adornment of vehicles; insurance; and uniforms. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members incurred these substantial expenses as a direct result of performing their job duties.

48. By misclassifying its employees as "independent contractors," and further by contractually requiring those employees to pay Defendant's own expenses, Defendant has been unjustly enriched.

49. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Defendant has received substantial benefits to which it had no entitlement, at Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Class Members' expense, including lost profits, self-employment taxes, premiums for insurance to replace

workers compensation and disability benefits, business expenses, compensation of replacement workers, and other expenses.

50. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members are entitled to compensation for all of the business expenses they were illegally required by Defendant to bear, for all of the employment taxes, unemployment compensation and workers compensation the Defendant should have but did not pay, and Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members are entitled to the quantum meruit value of their services as employees.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
DECLARATORY RELIEF

51. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members hereby incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein, and further allege:

52. An actual controversy has arisen between the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members, on the one hand, and Defendant, on the other hand, relating to the following matters:

- a. Whether Defendant has unlawfully misclassified Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members as independent contractors, and have thus denied Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members of the common benefits of employee status, such as
 - i. wages;
 - ii. overtime pay;
 - iii. holiday pay;
 - iv. workers' compensation;
 - v. unemployment insurance;
 - vi. contributions to Defendant's retirement plan;
 - vii. income tax withholding;
 - viii. meal, break and rest periods.
- b. Whether Defendant has unlawfully failed to pay benefits and compensation owing in a timely manner to Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class

Members whose employment with Defendant ended, as required by Kentucky law.

- c. What amounts Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members are entitled to receive in compensation and benefits.
- d. What amounts Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members are entitled to receive in interest on unpaid compensation due and owing.
- e. What amounts Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members are entitled to receive from Defendant in waiting time penalties.

53. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members further seek entry of a declaratory judgment in their favor which declares Defendant's practices as heretofore alleged to be unlawful and which provides for recovery of all sums determined by this Court to be owed by Defendant to the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

54. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members hereby incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein, and further allege:

55. Defendant will continue to misclassify Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members as independent contractors and unlawfully deny them the common benefits of employee status.

56. Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members have been injured and damaged, and are threatened with injury and damage, by Defendant's continued misclassification and unlawful refusal to pay all compensation and benefits as heretofore alleged, and Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members have no adequate remedy at law.

57. Defendant has acted, and threatened to act, on grounds generally applicable to the individual members of the Class, thereby making appropriate preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining Defendant and its agents from practicing the unlawful practices heretofore alleged.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs requests that judgment be entered against Defendant for the following:

1. Declaring that the Defendant's acts described in this Complaint constitute violations of the Kentucky Wage and Hour laws and Kentucky common law;
2. An award of benefits due them under the programs, agreements and plans described above with an appropriate award of interest;
3. An award of damages for their erroneous exclusion from the programs, agreements and plans described above with an appropriate award of interest;
4. Clarification and enforcement of their rights under these programs, agreements and plans;
5. An award of damages for all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Class Members necessary to perform their jobs for Defendant described above with an appropriate award of interest;
6. Fees and penalties pursuant to K.R.S. 337.990;
7. Rescinding the Operating Agreement, and awarding restitution compensating for the reasonable value of the benefit provided to Defendant;
8. An award of punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial;
9. Attorney fees and costs as provided by law; and,
10. Such other further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.

Dated: January 9, 2006

Respectfully submitted,

LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P.

s/Susan E. Ellingstad

Susan E. Ellingstad
100 Washington Avenue South
Suite 2200
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Tel: (612) 339-6900
Fax: (612) 339-0981

Lynn Rossman Faris
LEONARD CARDER, LLP
1330 Broadway, Suite 1450
Oakland, CA 94612
Tel: (510) 272-0169
Fax: (510) 272-0174

Robert I. Harwood
WECHSLER HARWOOD LLP
488 Madison Avenue, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10022
Tel: (212) 935-7400
Fax: (212) 753-3630

PLAINTIFFS' CO-LEAD COUNSEL

Mark B. Wallace
WALKER, VAUGHN & WALLACE, PLLC
7403 St. Andrews Church Road
Louisville, KY 40214
Tel: (502) 937-1944
Fax: (502) 937-1117

J. Gordon Rudd
Anne T. Regan
ZIMMERMAN REED
651 Nicollet Mall
Suite 501
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Tel: (612) 341-0400
Fax: (612) 341-0844

William M. Audet
ALEXANDER, HAWES & AUDET, LLP
300 Montgomery Street
Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94104
Tel: (415) 982-1776
Fax: (415) 579-1776

Clayton D. Halunen
Joni M. Thome
HALUNEN & ASSOCIATES
220 South Sixth Street
Suite 2000
Minneapolis, MN 55402
Tel: (612) 605-4098
Fax: (612) 605-4099

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Susan E. Ellingstad, hereby certify that on January 9, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which sent notification of such filing to the following:

George A Barton – gbarton@birch.net

Evelyn L Becker – ebecker@omm.com

Thomas J Brunner Jr – Tom.Brunner@bakerd.com

Jerald R Cureton – jcureton@curetoncaplan.com

Edward J Efke – eefkeman@fedex.com

Lynn R Faris – lfaris@leonardcarder.com

Wood R Foster Jr – woodfoster@sbgdf.com

Alison G Fox – Alison.Fox@bakerd.com

Philip Stephen Fuoco – pfuoco@msn.com

Martin S Garfinkel – garfinkel@sgb-law.com

Clayton D Halunen – Halunen@youhaverights.info

John C Hamilton – jch@hamiltonfirm.com hamiltonfirm@sbcglobal.net

Robert I Harwood – rharwood@whesq.com

Tom A Jerman – tjerman@omm.com

Jordan M Lewis – jordanlewis@sbgdf.com

Shannon Liss-Riordan – sliss@prle.com

Gary F Lynch – glynych@carlsonlynch.com

Daniel O Myers – dmyers@rpwb.com

Richard T Phillips – flip@smithphillips.com

C Victor Pyle III – victor.pyle@ogletreedeakins.com

Anne T Regan – atr@zimmreed.com

Robert G Rikard – rrikard@attorneyssc.com

J Gordon Rudd – jgr@zimmreed.com

Robert M Schwartz – rschwartz@omm.com

Edith A Thomas – edithomas1@aol.com

Joni M Thome – Thome@youhaverights.info

Matthew T Tobin – matt@jhmmj.com

Michael J Watton – jdrewicz@Wattongroup.com

and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non CM/ECF participants::

John H. Beisner
O'Melveny & Myers, LLP
1625 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-4001

Dated: January 9, 2006

Respectfully submitted,

LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P.

s/Susan E. Ellingstad

Susan E. Ellingstad
100 Washington Avenue South
Suite 2200
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Tel: (612) 339-6900
Fax: (612) 339-0981